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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-1554 
___________ 
 
MUKASH KUMAR MANEKLAL PATEL, 
                                                                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A74 586 999) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 23, 2011 
Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and  
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 24, 2011) 
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Harold D. Block, Esq. 
710 North Plankinton Avenue  
Milwaukee, WI 53203 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
 
Dawn S. Conrad, Esq. 
Matthew B. George, Esq. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice  
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division  
P.O. Box 878  
Ben Franklin Station  
Washington, DC 20044  
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Mukash Kumar Maneklal Patel, a citizen of India, 
entered the United States without inspection in January 1996.  
The former Immigration and Naturalization Service took him 
into custody in Texas.  On January 14, 1996, Patel was 
personally served with an Order to Show Cause, which 
charged him with being deportable pursuant to former 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 241(a)(1)(B) [8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)].  The Order to Show Cause was read 
to Patel in Hindi, and Patel acknowledged receipt by signing 
the Order.  On April 5, 1996, Patel posted bond and was 
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released from detention.  Patel later asserted that he was 
unaware of who had posted the money for his release, and 
“walked around aimlessly for 6 hours in the rain” until he 
found a bus depot.  Patel boarded a bus for St. Louis, 
Missouri.  Shortly thereafter, he traveled to Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 
Meanwhile, Patel’s family hired Saul Brown, an 
attorney in New York, who entered his appearance on April 
12, 1996.  On April 23, 1996, Attorney Brown submitted a 
motion to change venue, asserting that Patel was staying with 
friends in New Jersey.  Over the Government’s objections, 
the Immigration Court granted the motion and transferred the 
matter to the Immigration Court in Newark, New Jersey.  By 
certified letter dated May 24, 1996, the Immigration Court 
notified Attorney Brown that Patel’s master calendar hearing 
was scheduled for September 13, 1996.  The record contains a 
signed return receipt, indicating that someone in Attorney 
Brown’s office accepted the notice. 
On August 27, 1996, Attorney Brown moved to 
withdraw from the case, arguing that he had not “seen or 
heard from the respondent since the respondent was released 
from detention . . . .”  At the time, Attorney Brown 
acknowledged that Patel’s next hearing was scheduled for 
September 13, 1996.  The Immigration Court denied the 
motion to withdraw on September 6, 1996.  Patel did not 
appear for the September 13, 1996, hearing, and he was 
ordered deported in absentia on September 16, 1996.  Notice 
of the Immigration Judge=s (“IJ”) decision was mailed to 
Attorney Brown. 
Thirteen years later, in September 2009, Patel filed a 
motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that he had 
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not received proper notice of the hearing.  The IJ denied the 
motion, holding that Patel “was provided with proper notice 
of his deportation case.”  The IJ noted that notice of his 
September 13, 1996, hearing was sent by certified by mail to 
Patel’s attorney of record, that Patel had made no effort to 
contact his family to ascertain the name of the attorney who 
posted his bond, or to hire another attorney, and that he 
otherwise failed to “take[] reasonable action to determine his 
obligation to the Immigration Court and to his attorney of 
record.”  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
dismissed Patel’s appeal.  It agreed that Patel had received 
proper notice under the statutory requirements in effect in 
1996.  Even if Attorney Brown was not authorized to 
represent Patel, the BIA concluded that notice was adequate 
because Patel had not complied with the requirement, set 
forth in the Order to Show Cause, that he notify the 
Immigration Court of address and telephone number changes.  
Patel filed a timely petition for review from the order. 
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a) [8 U.S.C. 
§252(a)].  “We review the denial of a motion to reopen a 
removal order entered in absentia for abuse of discretion.”  
Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992)).  Thus, 
in order to succeed on the petition for review, Patel must 
ultimately show that the discretionary decision was somehow 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Tipu v. INS, 20 
F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Because Patel’s immigration proceedings were 
initiated prior to the 1996 amendments to the INA, we must 
apply the notice requirements set forth in former INA § 242B 
[8 U.S.C. § 1252b].  Under that statute, aliens were to be 
notified of the time and place of their deportation hearings 
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either in person or by certified mail sent to the alien or the 
alien’s counsel of record.  See INA § 242B(a)(2)(A) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252b(a)(2)(A)].  In the event an alien failed to appear for a 
hearing, the Government had to prove “by clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence” that the alien was provided with 
notice of the sort described in subsection (a)(2) and that the 
alien was deportable.  INA § 242B(c)(1) [8 U.S.C. 
§1252b(c)(1)].  Written notice was sufficient if it was 
“provided at the most recent address” furnished by the alien.  
Id.  The in absentia deportation order could be rescinded if 
the alien moved to reopen at any time and demonstrated that 
he did not receive notice in accordance with subsection 
(a)(2).
1
  See INA §242B(c)(3)(B) [8 U.S.C. §1252b(c)(3)(B)]. 
We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to reopen because, for purposes of 
                                                 
 
1
 The proceedings could also be reopened at any time 
if the alien demonstrated that he was in custody and that the 
failure to appear was through no fault of his own.  See INA 
§ 242B(c)(3) [8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)].  Also, an in absentia 
order of removal could be rescinded “upon a motion to 
reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the order of 
deportation if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear 
was because of exceptional circumstances.”  INA § 242B 
(c)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A)].  Neither of these 
provisions is applicable here because Patel was not in 
custody, his motion to reopen was filed 13 years after he was 
ordered deported in absentia, and, as noted below, he did not 
act diligently as would be required for equitably tolling the 
time period for filing a motion to reopen based on exceptional 
circumstances.  See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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rescinding an in absentia removal order under INA 
§ 242B(c)(3), Patel has failed to demonstrate that he “did not 
receive notice” of the hearing.  It is clear that Attorney Brown 
was notified of the September 13, 1996, hearing.  See Santana 
Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a strong presumption of receipt applies when a 
notice from an Immigration Court is sent by certified mail).  
Furthermore, Patel no longer disputes that Attorney Brown 
was his counsel of record during the relevant time period.  Cf. 
Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 672-74 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(suggesting that new hearing would be required if petitioner 
could substantiate his allegations that his attorney was not 
authorized to enter an appearance on his behalf).  In April 
1996, Attorney Brown entered his appearance before the 
Immigration Court in Texas.  On the Entry of Appearance 
form, Attorney Brown checked the box labeled “Deportation 
(Including Bond Redetermination)” to indicate the “type of 
proceeding for which I am entering an appearance.”  Attorney 
Brown then successfully moved for a change of venue to 
Newark, New Jersey.  Shortly thereafter, on May 24, 1996, 
the Immigration Court notified Attorney Brown by certified 
letter that Patel’s master calendar hearing was scheduled for 
September 13, 1996.  Although Attorney Brown moved to 
withdraw from the case shortly before the scheduled hearing 
because he had “not seen or heard from” Patel, the IJ denied 
the motion.  Thus, Attorney Brown was Patel’s counsel of 
record when the hearing notice was sent and on the date of 
the hearing.
2
 
                                                 
 
2
 We agree with the BIA that, even assuming that 
Attorney Brown was not authorized to represent Patel, he 
cannot establish that he did not receive notice of the hearing.  
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Patel argues that “[f]or the in absentia order to be 
valid, . . . actual notice [of the hearing had to be] effected on 
[him] through Attorney Brown.”  We disagree.  Service by 
certified mail to an alien’s attorney can satisfy the INA’s 
notice requirement.  See Scorteanu v. INS, 339 F.3d 407, 412 
(6th Cir. 2003); see also Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1277 
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[N]o statutory provision requires an alien 
to receive actual notice of a deportation proceeding.”).  Patel 
asserts, however, that “the purpose for serving [Attorney] 
Brown, as [his] representative, was defunct ab initio” because 
Attorney Brown was unable to contact him.  Importantly, 
however, Patel contributed to his lack of notice by failing to 
make any effort to contact Attorney Brown or to keep himself 
apprised of his immigration proceedings.
3
  In Bejar v. 
                                                                                                             
There is no evidence in the record that Patel complied with 
the requirement, set forth in the Order to Show Cause, that he 
inform the Immigration Court of his current mailing address.  
See Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 
2009) (recognizing that “an alien’s failure to receive actual 
notice of a removal hearing due to his neglect of his 
obligation to keep the immigration court apprised of his 
current mailing address” does not entitle the alien to 
rescission of an in absentia removal order). 
 
 
3
 Patel complains that the Order to Show Cause, which 
informed him of his obligation to update his current address 
with the Immigration Court, was read to him in Hindi, rather 
than his native language, Gujarati.  Any claim related to the 
interpretation of the Order to Show Cause has been waived, 
however, because Patel did not exhaust it with the BIA.  See 
Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  He 
did allege in his motion to reopen that that “the only way [he] 
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Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 127, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2003), the 
petitioner’s attorney had received notice of the removal 
hearing, but was unable to locate and communicate with his 
client because she had moved and had failed to provide her 
attorney with her new address.  See Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 
251 (discussing facts of Bejar).  We stated that “we cannot 
entertain an appeal based on [petitioner’s] allegation that she 
personally failed to receive notice, for it is undisputed that her 
former attorney received timely notice of her removal 
hearing, and service upon her attorney is considered to be 
legally sufficient.”  Bejar, 324 F.3d at 131.  Here, given 
Patel’s lack of diligence, we conclude that he has failed to 
demonstrate that he did not receive notice in accordance with 
INA § 242B(a)(2).  Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in holding that Patel was not entitled to rescission 
of the in absentia deportation order. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
                                                                                                             
would have known [of] his obligation to apprise the Service 
of his current address B the papers the Service served upon 
release on bond B had been rain-soaked, waterlogged and 
obliterated.”  Because Patel has not argued this point in his 
opening brief, we will not consider it.  See Bradley v. Att’y 
Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
argument not raised in opening brief is waived). 
